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I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
  In recent years, democratic legislatures have struggled to maintain a role for 
themselves in government decisions to conduct extraterritorial military op-
erations, including those that involve the use of force. The U.S. Congress 
offers a prime example of this phenomenon, but other legislatures such as 
the British Parliament and the French National Assembly face similar chal-
lenges.1 Some of these challenges are due to constitutional provisions, insti-
tutional structures and historical practice. Even constitutions that give legis-
latures a role in authorizing military force ex ante often empower executives 
to respond to sudden attacks without legislative blessing. Further, executive 
branches are necessarily better structured than legislatures to collect classi-
fied information, respond quickly to urgent security threats and direct mili-
tary operations.2 
Not all legislative limitations are linked to constitutional rules or struc-
tures, however. These legislatures are also struggling to preserve their roles 
because of the changing nature of conflict: a shift away from large-scale, ki-
netic operations toward smaller-scale operations, including operations in cy-
berspace, that are harder to detect publicly and do not require the type of 
robust legislative support that large-scale conflicts do.3 These modern oper-
ations leave legislatures struggling to learn the facts and engaging in ex post 
                                                                                                                      
1. See, e.g., UNITED KINGDOM, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL AF-
FAIRS COMMITTEE, THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN THE UK CONSTITUTION: AUTHORIZ-
ING THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE (Aug. 6, 2019), https://publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubadm/1891/189102.htm; Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, Par-
liamentary Scrutiny of Military Operations in France and Germany, EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR 
POLITICAL RESEARCH, https://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/ca1d8496-d41c-47d7-
96c7-d35ef4532c90.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2020). Although legislatures in non-democratic 
systems also face challenges in regulating and overseeing their executives, that problem ex-
tends far beyond the cyber issues that I discuss here. 
2. Overclassification by executive branches, or an excessive unwillingness to share clas-
sified information with legislative overseers, are persistent problems in checking executive 
national security activities. This article assumes that legislatures will continue to face hurdles 
on this front, and intends to highlight how cyber autonomy will create additional hurdles. 
3. Jack Goldsmith & Matthew Waxman, The Legal Legacy of Light-Footprint Warfare, 37 
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY 7, 10 (2016) (noting that cyberattacks are low-visibility and 
arguing that they “attract[] less public, congressional, and diplomatic scrutiny than the op-
erations [they] replaced”). 
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and sometimes ineffective efforts to hold their executive branches account-
able for offensive cyber operations that could lead to hostilities with other 
States. 
The introduction of increased autonomy into this setting has the poten-
tial to further alter the existing relationships between executives and legisla-
tures in making decisions that implicate the use of force. Because the use of 
autonomous cyber tools may lead States into serious tensions—if not armed 
conflict—with other States without advance notice, these capabilities pose 
particular hurdles for legislatures that already struggle to stay relevant on use 
of force and cyber issues. Additionally, a State’s ability to employ autono-
mous cyber tools may alter the dynamics among different actors within exec-
utive branches themselves—by, for instance, diverting deliberative input and 
oversight abilities away from foreign, intelligence and justice ministries and 
toward defense ministries in the lead-up to conflict. 
This article explores how the use of increasingly autonomous cyber tools 
may alter the current state of legislative oversight and internal executive de-
cision-making about the resort to force. It also illustrates how these changes 
may impact international peace and security; and it identifies ways in which 
States may prevent a further erosion of democratic accountability for cyber-
related jus ad bellum decisions. Unless legislatures take steps now to preserve 
a role for themselves, and unless executive branches ensure that an appro-
priate diversity of officials remains involved in use of force decisions, key 
vestiges of democratic accountability for those decisions may fall away. Ex-
ecutives will not wait long for their legislatures to act, given the urgency of 
cyber threats. 
Part II examines the likely trajectory of national security-related cyber 
autonomy within various States. Part III briefly sets out the powers that var-
ious States have allocated to their legislatures on use of force issues. Part IV 
synthesizes those analyses to contemplate the additional challenges that 
growing levels of cyber autonomy will pose to legislatures—and civilian ac-
tors within executive branches—that seek to retain input into governmental 
decisions that may lead to interstate conflict. Part V sets out some normative 
proposals for ways in which legislatures and executive branches can meet 
these challenges. This Part argues that legislatures should bolster their own 
technological expertise and consider enacting laws that place appropriate pa-
rameters on the executive branches’ development and use of cyber auton-
omy. Within executive branches, civilian policymakers and lawyers from a 
range of agencies should insist on a role for themselves in developing the 
rules of the road for using autonomous cyber tools. 
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II. THE PROSPECTS FOR CYBER AUTONOMY 
 
In national security settings, States are increasingly likely to deploy cyber 
tools that use heightened levels of autonomy. This Part describes generally 
the prospects for burgeoning cyber autonomy within State military and in-
telligence systems, and then details the ways in which cyber autonomy may 
lead to situations of serious interstate tensions or even armed conflict. 
 
A. Defining Cyber Autonomy 
 
Before discussing why States have incentives to increase the levels of auton-
omy that they build into their cyber tools, it is necessary to explain what this 
article means by “autonomy.” Autonomy exists on a continuum: systems 
may be more or less autonomous, or not autonomous at all.4 As Tim McFar-
land writes: 
 
While there is no precise threshold [beyond which a system becomes au-
tonomous], the term is generally associated with self-governing machines 
whose task requires higher levels of “algorithmic and hardware sophistica-
tion” and the ability to operate in the face of uncertainty. . .. [A] self-gov-
erning system is more likely to be described as “autonomous” where hu-
man observers lack the ability to precisely foresee the exact sequence of 
steps that the system must take in order to complete its assigned task (or, 
equivalently, cannot foresee all events that will transpire when the system 
is activated).5 
 
Others have noted, “A system with a high level of autonomy is one that can 
be neglected for a long period of time without [human] interaction.”6 
There is a modest level of autonomy in any system that achieves goals 
previously programmed by its operator without needing to receive instruc-
tions from the operator on an ongoing basis.7 As the task or the environment 
                                                                                                                      
4. Tim McFarland, The Concept of Autonomy, at 22 (2020) (working paper on file with 
author) (“Autonomy is inherently a matter of degree.”); Defense Science Board, U.S. De-
partment of Defense, The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, at 4 (2012) [hereinafter Defense 
Science Board] (noting that “system autonomy is a continuum”). 
5. McFarland, supra note 4, at 4–5.  
6. Michael A. Goodrich & Alan C. Schultz, Human-Robot Interaction: A Survey, in FOUN-
DATIONS AND TRENDS IN HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 203, 217 (Youn-kyung Lim 
ed., 2007). 
7. McFarland, supra note 4, at 9. 
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in which the system is operating becomes more complex, autonomous sys-
tems will require more complex coding to achieve the operator’s desired re-
sult.8 This might be the case, for instance, when a State’s military expects that 
its system will encounter a “high degree of uncertainty in the environment 
in which it operates,” perhaps because it may confront an adversary’s auton-
omous system.9 The more self-adaptive a cyber system is, the more likely it 
is that the system will be able to operate in those uncertain environments.10 
It is possible to design systems so that they do not need “detailed fore-
knowledge of all combinations of circumstances which the software entity 
may encounter once it is in operation”; other systems may learn “online” 
once deployed.11 Such systems fall on the higher end of autonomy. 
 
B. The Coming of Increased Cyber Autonomy 
 
The trend toward increasing autonomy across weapons and weapons sys-
tems is pronounced. In his book Army of None, Paul Scharre predicts that 
this same trend will manifest itself in cyberweapons. He writes, “Cyberweap-
ons of the future—defensive and offensive—will incorporate greater auton-
omy, just the same way that more autonomy is being integrated into missiles, 
drones, and physical systems like Aegis.”12 Indeed, another scholar notes that 
States already are widely deploying autonomous cyberweapons.13 Stuxnet is 
an example of a cyber operation that entailed considerable autonomy: the 
cyber worm that the United States and Israel reportedly directed against 
Iran’s nuclear centrifuges was “an autonomous goal-oriented intelligent 
piece of software capable of spreading, communicating, targeting and self-
updating.”14 
                                                                                                                      
8. Id. at 9–10. 
9. Id. at 10–11. 
10. Id. at 11 (discussing self-adaptive systems). 
11. Id. at 13. 
12. PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF 
WAR, at 222 (2018). 
13. Rebecca Crootof, Autonomous Weapons and the Limits of Analogy, 9 HARVARD NA-
TIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 51, 81 (2018); see also Rain Liivoja et al., Autonomous Cyber Ca-
pabilities Under International Law, THE NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF 
EXCELLENCE, at 11–12 (2019) (discussing existing defensive and offensive cyber capabili-
ties). 
14. Stamatis Karnouskos, Stuxnet Worm Impact on Industrial Cyber-Physical System Security, 
37TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE IEEE INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS SOCIETY (2011), 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6120048. 
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There are at least two reasons why States increasingly will rely on auton-
omy in their cyber operations. First, and most obviously, the speed of adver-
saries’ offensive cyber operations requires States to defend their systems at the 
same battle speed—which may be faster than a human can react. States will 
need to rely on some level of autonomy to have a chance at successfully 
defending their systems.15 In the United States, a 2016 Defense Science 
Board (DSB) report described existing autonomous systems that “carry out 
real-time cyber defense” while “also extract[ing] useful information about 
the attacks and generat[ing] signatures that help predict and defeat future 
attacks across the entire network.”16 It also cited a tool called Tutelage, which 
autonomously inspects and analyzes three million packets per second on an 
unclassified Defense Department computer system to prevent attacks.17 The 
DSB report further imagined the existence of autonomous systems “to con-
trol rapid-fire exchanges of cyber weapons and defenses,” which would seem 
to require greater elements of autonomy than packet inspection systems.18 
The U.S. government seems to have pursued those systems. In 2017, the 
Defense Innovation Unit Experimental contracted for the Voltron project, 
which uses artificial intelligence to “automatically detect, patch and exploit 
existing software vulnerabilities.”19 The contract outlined defense use cases, 
but the system also “has the potential to be used for offensive hacking pur-
poses.”20 
Second, deploying offensive cyber systems that are increasingly autono-
mous will make it easier for States to identify and then exploit adversaries’ 
cyber vulnerabilities21 because the systems can take advantage of machine-
learning tools. These tools can identify patterns or abnormalities among vast 
                                                                                                                      
15. Crootof, supra note 13, at 81 (noting that “the speed of cyber will nearly always 
require that countermeasures be automated or autonomous to be effective”). 
16. Defense Science Board, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science 
Board: Summer Study on Autonomy, at 92 (2016). 
17. Id. at 58. 
18. Id. at 4. 
19. Chris Bing, The Tech Behind the DARPA Grand Challenge Winner Will Now Be Used by 
the Pentagon, CYBERSCOOP (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.cyberscoop.com/mayhem-
darpa- cyber-grand-challenge-dod-voltron/. 
20. Id. 
21. The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Autonomous Weapons and Cyber 
Operations, UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, at 4 (2017), 
https://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-cyber-oper-
ations-en-690.pdf [hereinafter UNIDIR]; Eric Messinger, Is It Possible to Ban Autonomous 
Weapons in Cyberwar?, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/19119/ 
ban-autonomous-weapons-cyberwar/. 
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quantities of data, which is helpful to detect flaws in and infiltrate adver-
saries’ cyber defenses. As James Johnson and Eleanor Krabill note, “The 
machine speed of AI-augmented cyber tools could enable even a low-skilled 
attacker to penetrate an adversary’s cyber defenses. It could also use ad-
vanced persistent threat tools to find new vulnerabilities.”22 
Of course, defensive and offensive uses of autonomous cyber systems 
are interconnected. Even if States would prefer to use autonomous cyber 
systems solely in a defensive posture, Eric Messinger argues that the devel-
opment of cyber defenses means that “the development and deployment of 
offensive [autonomous cyber weapons] may well be unavoidable.”23 
Messinger notes, 
 
Powerful trends will exist toward optimizing offensive operations in cyber, 
and the paths of development for offensive malware could increasingly in-
volve autonomous agents. Consider, for instance, a Washington Post re-
port on the NSA’s proposed use of a system, “code-named TURBINE, 
that is capable of managing ‘potentially millions of implants’”—e.g., so-
phisticated malware—“for intelligence gathering ‘and active attack.’” 
Though the details would matter for classifying such a system as autono-
mous, as opposed to “semi-autonomous” or automated, it is easy to envi-
sion capabilities in the medium-term for which no other description is pos-
sible.24 
 
Scharre contemplates a world in which offensive cyber operations go a 
step further. Instead of simply developing tools that actively manage im-
plants or seek out enemy vulnerabilities, Scharre speculates that States might 
develop cyber tools that, once deployed, can fix themselves in the field and 
resist attack. He notes, “Adaptive malware that could rewrite itself to hide 
and avoid scrutiny at superhuman speeds could be incredibly virulent.”25 In 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s 2016 Grand Cyber Chal-
lenge, ForAllSecure’s system was “capable of automatically healing a friendly 
                                                                                                                      
22. James Johnson & Eleanor Krabill, AI, Cyberspace, and Nuclear Weapons, WAR ON THE 
ROCKS (Jan. 31, 2020), https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/ai-cyberspace-and-nuclear-
weapons/. 
23. Messinger, supra note 21. 
24. Id. 
25. SCHARRE, supra note 12, at 226; see also Alessandro Guarino, Autonomous Intelligent 
Agents in Cyber Offense, 2013 5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 
(2013), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/2_d1r1s9_guarino.pdf (envisioning autono-
mous agents that are able to identify “possible threats from defenders” and “prevent and 
react to countermeasures”). 
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system while simultaneously scanning and attacking vulnerabilities in adver-
sary systems.”26 The U.S. National Security Agency reportedly developed, or 
at least sought to develop, a system that would employ algorithms that con-
stantly analyze metadata to detect malicious patterns, stop those attacks, and 
autonomously initiate retaliatory counterattacks.27 Others envision decentral-
ized swarms of autonomous agents that could attack systems without the 
need for centralized command and control.28 
The United States is not the only State interested in bolstering the au-
tonomy of its cyber operations. The United Kingdom has expressed an in-
terest in pursuing autonomous cyber weapons as well.29 Russian officials 
have stated that they view artificial intelligence as “a key to dominating cy-
berspace and information operations,” which suggests they intend to rely on 
certain levels of autonomy to achieve that goal.30 China, too, appears com-
mitted to developing autonomous cyber capabilities.31 Although fully auton-
omous offensive cyber systems may remain speculative today, they lie within 
the realm of possibility. It is therefore worth considering how these tools—
or even systems with moderate levels of autonomy—might escalate low-level 
cyber exchanges into uses of force that implicate international and domestic 
laws, or at least leave States poised on the brink of armed conflict. 
 
C. How Cyber Autonomy Could Lead to Hostilities 
 
Cyber operations have the capacity to cause physical damage and, potentially, 
human harm. To date, very few of the known cyber operations have caused 
levels of damage that constitute uses of force or armed attacks under the UN 
                                                                                                                      
26. Bing, supra note 19. 
27. CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE IMPACT OF CYBER WARFARE, SOCIAL ME-
DIA, AND TECHNOLOGY, at 55 (Nicholas Sambaluk ed. 2019). 
28. Guarino, supra note 25. 
29. UNITED KINGDOM, NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016–2021, ¶ 7.3.6 
(2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf. 
30. Peter Apps, Are China, Russia Winning the AI Arms Race?, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-ai-commentary/commentary-are-china-russia-
winning-the-ai-arms-race-idUSKCN1P91NM. 
31. Bill Gertz, US and China Racing to Weaponize AI, ASIA TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019), 
https://asiatimes.com/2019/11/us-and-china-racing-to-weaponize-ai/ (stating that “Chi-
nese multi-domain AI warfare will expand the battlespace from traditional air, sea, and land, 
to . . . cyberspace” and discussing military operations to include “electronic countermeas-
ures” and “cybertakeover”). 
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Charter.32 Yet States clearly have contemplated that cyber operations could 
produce such a result. Former U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Harold 
Koh noted, for instance, “Commonly cited examples of cyber activity that 
would constitute a use of force include, for example: (1) operations that trig-
ger a nuclear plant meltdown; (2) operations that open a dam above a pop-
ulated area causing destruction; or (3) operations that disable air traffic con-
trol resulting in airplane crashes.”33 These types of operations, though still 
unrealized, are well within the realm of the possible, whether States or non-
state actors commit them using cyber attacks with low or high levels of au-
tonomy. 
Even if an initial offensive cyber operation does not rise to the level of 
a use of force, some scholars have argued that the cyber domain is one in 
which escalation is likely.34 Because it is harder to predict the impact of a 
given cyber operation than to predict the impact of a missile, there is greater 
room for miscalculation, even if the victim State intends to respond in a 
proportionate manner. As Scharre notes, “You can have an accident that 
spirals out of control very badly that has a widespread effect in ways that are 
not possible with people” because humans cannot make the same number 
of errors as fast.35 It also can be hard for States to signal their intentions in 
cyberspace, and those signals are an important way to avoid inadvertent es-
calation.36 
                                                                                                                      
32. Gary Corn & Eric Jensen, The Use of Force and Cyber Countermeasures, 32 TEMPLE 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 127 (2018) (noting that “most un-
friendly acts between nations fall below the use of force”). 
33. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 
18, 2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm. 
34. See, e.g., Herbert Lin, Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace, 6 STRA-
TEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY 46 (2012); Michèle Flournoy, Avril Haines & Gabrielle Chefitz, 
Building Trust through Testing 8, WESTEXEC (Oct. 2020), https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf (“The potential for unintended en-
gagement or escalation is even greater when U.S. and/or adversary systems have the sorts 
of advanced autonomy features that deep learning can enable, and their interaction cannot 
be studied or fully tested in advance of deployment.”). 
35. Johanna Costigan, Four Specialists Describe Their Diverse Approaches to China’s AI Devel-
opment, NEW AMERICA (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initia-
tive/digichina/blog/four-specialists-describe-their-diverse-approaches-chinas-ai-develop-
ment/. 
36. Brandon Valeriano, Managing Escalation Under Layered Cyber Deterrence, LAWFARE 
(Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/managing-escalation-under-layered-cyber-
deterrence. 
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Other scholars have suggested that concerns about cyber escalation are 
overblown. One pair of scholars, for instance, notes the world has seen little 
such escalation to date, perhaps because the tools and knowledge about vul-
nerabilities that a State needs to retaliate in cyberspace may not exist at the 
time the responding State needs them.37 Further, decision-makers may be 
hesitant to respond to hostile cyber operations in some circumstances.38 
Some of these constraints on escalation may weaken, however, when a 
State employs highly autonomous cyber systems. First, highly autonomous 
systems might by their nature be able to penetrate adversary systems more 
quickly and deftly than human-in-the-loop systems, requiring fewer ad-
vanced manual efforts to develop targets. Second, assuming that clear sig-
naling is a good way to avoid unintended escalation, it may be harder for 
State operators to signal their intent to adversaries in advance of or during 
an autonomous cyber operation when those specific operations may happen 
without human pre-planning and possibly without knowledge of the oppo-
nent’s identity. Third, highly autonomous cyber tools may act less predicta-
bly than human-in-the-loop systems, especially when confronting other au-
tonomous systems. A UN report noted, 
 
As with the occasional stock market “flash crashes”, different algorithms—
and even systems with very little autonomy—may interact in unforeseen 
ways before a human has time to intervene. . .. Emergent effects (un-
planned and unintended) arise from interaction between the systems, and 
these effects are by definition unpredictable, so our ability to plan for how 
to mitigate their consequences is poor.39 
 
Fourth, even if a State itself takes steps to avoid a “flash conflict” be-
tween its own cyber algorithm and another actor’s algorithm, a third State 
                                                                                                                      
37. See Erica Borghard & Shawn Lonergan, Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation, 
13 STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY 122 (2019); see also Sarah Kreps & Jacquelyn Schneider, 
Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains: Moving Beyond Effects-Based 
Logics, 5 JOURNAL OF CYBERSECURITY 1 (2019); Valeriano, supra note 36 (arguing that the 
cyber domain is not “escalation dominant” but noting that there is “no uniform view of 
how escalation should work in cyberspace”). 
38. See Borghard & Lonergan, supra note 37; THOMAS RID, CYBER WAR WILL NOT 
TAKE PLACE (2013) (arguing that the real threats are espionage, sabotage, and subversion, 
not armed conflict initiated in cyberspace); Jon Randall Lindsay, Restrained by Design: The 
Political Economy of Cybersecurity, 19 DIGITAL POLICY, REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE 493 
(2017). 
39. UNIDIR, supra note 21, at 9. 
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could deliberately design a cyber operation to trigger this type of event be-
tween two of its adversaries.40 Particularly for autonomous systems driven 
by artificial intelligence, “autonomy itself will likely increase a military’s vul-
nerability to cyberattacks” because artificial intelligence can increase the an-
onymity of attacks in cyberspace and thus facilitate an adversary’s efforts to 
“use malware to take control, manipulate, or fool the behavior and pattern-
recognition systems of autonomous systems.”41 These factors, taken to-
gether, suggest that autonomous systems may be susceptible to escalating 
cyber hostilities, even if States do not engineer them to be so. 
None of this is to suggest that the developers of highly autonomous sys-
tems lack control over the parameters of their systems; after all, the “behav-
iour of an autonomous software entity is ultimately dependent upon actions 
of people in relevant positions, notably its designer and operator, due to the 
nature of computers and software.”42 What it does suggest is that a highly 
autonomous system may not act entirely predictably on its own, especially if 
it relies on machine learning, and it may act especially unpredictably when it 
confronts another actor’s autonomous system. It is this situation—when the 
system deviates in problematic ways from decisions that a human would 
have made had the human undertaken the task—that gives rise to new types 
of democratic and strategic concerns. 
 
D. Autonomy and International Law 
 
Notwithstanding these looming problems with increased autonomy, inter-
national law does not expressly prohibit States from using autonomous cyber 
tools. Although many States have agreed that existing bodies of international 
law—including the UN Charter and the laws of armed conflict—apply in 
cyberspace, those laws do not specifically preclude the use of autonomous 
systems or weapons. Instead, States are governed by the traditional jus ad 
bellum rules that regulate their resort to force and jus in bello rules that regulate 
the conduct of armed conflict, whether they use autonomous cyber tools or 
not. This means that States have a legal obligation to ensure that they deploy 
autonomous cyber systems in a way that comports with those rules. It would 
                                                                                                                      
40. Id. at 10. 
41. Johnson & Krabill, supra note 22. 
42. McFarland, supra note 4, at 8; see also Defense Science Board, supra note 4, at 1–2 
(“[A]ll autonomous systems are supervised by human operators at some level, and autono-
mous systems’ software embodies the designed limits on the actions and decisions delegated 
to the computer.”). 
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be lawful, for instance, for a State to “produce and rely on machine-learning 
algorithms that allow them to defend” against cyber armed attacks “at the 
speed of light, in what may come to look like automatic self-defense,”43 as 
long as those algorithms act consistent with the customary international law 
rules of necessity and proportionality.44 States that deploy autonomous cyber 
tools during armed conflict will need to ensure that those tools can comply 
with the jus in bello requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precau-
tions. Finally, concepts of state responsibility may help deter States from en-
gaging in internationally wrongful acts while using autonomous cyber tools. 
That said, building autonomous cyber systems that are able to detect 
when an incoming operation rises to the level of an armed attack, determine 
whether a cyber use of force is necessary in response, and initiate a cyber 
self-defense operation that is proportional to the incoming attack is easier 
said than done, as both a legal and practical matter. Former U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Robert Work was willing to accept the possibility that 
the United States might need to deploy automated cyber counterattacks but 
recognized that delegating authority to autonomous or automated systems 
comes with risks. He noted that a “machine might launch a counter cyber 
attack” and inadvertently cause an airplane to crash, for example, something 
that might violate the rules of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello.45 Further, be-
cause cyberattacks are likely to be “disguised by being routed through third-
party machines, such as an unwittingly infected botnet or third-party private 
or public servers,” autonomous responses risk targeting entities other than 
                                                                                                                      
43. Ashley Deeks, Noam Lubell & Daragh Murray, Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence, 
and the Use of Force by States, 10 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY 1, 7 (2019). 
44. Although most states have accepted that the UN Charter and the right to self-de-
fense attach in the cyber setting, a few States have resisted this idea, including Cuba. See 
Michael Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s Failure to 
Advance Cyber Norms, JUST SECURITY (June 30, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/427 
68/international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/. 
45. Liivoja et al., supra note 13, at 23. 
As the predictability of autonomous systems is one of the main challenges, any cyber capa-
bility autonomously executing such measures risks causing unforeseen effects. If those ef-
fects entail damage rising to the level of use of force, then the State operating the autono-
mous cyber capability has violated the prohibition on the use of force, and should these 
effects reach the threshold of an armed attack, then the other State has the right to respond 
with force in self defence. 
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the State that initiated the attack.46 An unwitting third-party State that sud-
denly faces hostile cyber operations from the original victim may well re-
spond in kind, setting the stage for unintended conflict. 
Autonomous activities in cyberspace thus risk escalating cyber interac-
tions to levels that violate international law, and possibly even to levels that 
constitute armed attacks that would trigger the adversary’s right to self-de-
fense. Delegating the authority to an autonomous system to decide when to 
respond to incoming attacks and effectively go on the counteroffensive 
“could be very dangerous.”47 This is especially true when States have asserted 
that they will only decide that something constitutes an armed attack based 
on a range of factors, including the apparent intent of the attacker and its 
identity.48 It would be virtually impossible for an autonomous cyber system 
today to ascertain and evaluate factors such as intent before taking a response 
in national self-defense. 
This all assumes that States would launch offensive or counteroffensive 
autonomous systems into the ether without plans to maintain meaningful 
control over them. It is far from clear that States, such as the United States, 
would do so. For instance, to help avoid consequences such as unintentional 
airplane crashes as the result of autonomous cyber operations, then-Deputy 
Secretary Work envisioned a role for scientists, lawyers and ethicists; auto-
mated safeties; and human oversight of the autonomous systems.49 Others 
have noted that “command and control of a true autonomous agent, espe-
cially a purely computational one . . . would have to translate chiefly in pre-
cise specifications of the agent’s target and objectives—the goals—or, in mil-
itary terms, in precise briefings before any mission.”50 In short, there are 
strategic measures that States should take to avoid unintended escalation and 
                                                                                                                      
46. Thomas Remington et al., Toward U.S.-Russian Bilateral Cooperation in the Sphere of 
Cybersecurity, WORKING GROUP ON FUTURE OF U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS, at 14 (2016), 
https://futureofusrussiarelations.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/wg_working_paper7_cy-
bersecurity_final.pdf. This is not to suggest that such mistakes could never happen in hu-
man-in-the-loop cyber responses. 
47. SCHARRE, supra note 12, at 223. 
48. See Koh, supra note 33 (“In assessing whether an event constituted a use of force in 
or through cyberspace, we must evaluate factors: including the context of the event, the 
actor perpetrating the action (recognizing challenging issues of attribution in cyberspace), 
the target and location, effects and intent, among other possible issues.”). 
49. SCHARRE, supra note 12, at 228. 
50. Guarino, supra note 25. 
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conflict when deploying highly autonomous cyber systems.51 The fact re-
mains, however, that unless carefully managed, autonomous cyber exchanges 
risk escalating offensive and counteroffensive operations to a point that 
could trigger one State’s right of self-defense and bring two States into hos-
tilities without considered governmental decisions to do so. 
 
III. LEGISLATIVE ROLES IN USES OF FORCE AND OTHER MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 
 
Part II illustrated that a range of States are likely to pursue high levels of 
cyber autonomy in an effort to protect their military systems and that such 
autonomy, unless carefully managed, raises the prospect of deliberate or un-
planned escalation into hostilities. In light of this, how can States ensure that 
their governments deploy cyber autonomy in a manner consistent with their 
constitutions and laws?52 In particular, how should legislatures regulate au-
tonomous cyber tools to ensure that their executive branches remain faithful 
to domestic and international law regulating the resort to interstate force or 
other military operations?53 This Part considers the several roles that legisla-
tures play today in authorizing or overseeing their executives’ military oper-
ations, to set the stage for Part IV’s analysis of how cyber autonomy may 
alter those dynamics. 
 
A. Democracies and Military Operations 
 
Several scholars have examined the extent to which legislatures play a role in 
States’ decisions to use interstate force and therefore provide democratic ac-
countability for those choices. In 1996, Lori Damrosch, for instance, identi-
fied a trend toward a greater legislative role in State decisions to resort to 
                                                                                                                      
51. See infra Part V. 
52. We should also care about the extent to which the use of autonomous cyber tools 
comports with international law – and in particular the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. See, e.g., 
Liivoja et al., supra note 13; Guarino, supra note 25 (discussing the applicability of those 
bodies of law to autonomous cyber agents). 
53. Some scholars argue that remote warfare technologies are intended to subvert dem-
ocratic control of war. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Do Drones Undermine Democracy?, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Jan. 22, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/do-drones-under-
mine-democracy/ (arguing that “new technology is short-circuiting the decision-making 
process for what used to be the most important choice a democracy could make”). This 
article assumes, however, that democratic states such as those in NATO wish to retain dem-
ocratic accountability for their use of autonomous military systems. 
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force.54 In 2003, she asserted that “democratic parliaments [] play active roles 
in determining the scope and terms of national commitments to multilateral 
peace operations” such as the operations in the First Gulf War and Ko-
sovo.55 Other scholars, likewise, have argued that since 1990, legislatures, at 
least in Europe, have sought to expand their involvement in decisions to use 
force abroad.56 
One reason why it matters whether legislatures play a role in a State’s 
decisions to deploy forces abroad or resort to force outside its territory is 
that mature democracies usually do not go to war with each other; they also 
are more likely to win the wars that they fight against autocratic states.57 This 
suggests that there are virtues to retaining a healthy role for democratic leg-
islatures in war-making decisions because they may help their States avoid 
“bad” wars and fight only “good” wars.58 Tom Ginsburg notes, 
 
The democratic advantage in war, some theorize, results from the need to 
mobilize support among the public before going to war. Legislatures can 
play a role here, most obviously . . . by requiring evidence to justify wars. . 
.. Another source of democratic advantage is signaling: when the debate 
about going to war takes place in public and results in a decision to fight, 
the counterparty can more reliably assume that the state in question is really 
committed. This might lead the counterparty to back down . . ..59 
 
                                                                                                                      
54. Lori Damrosch, Is There a General Trend in Constitutional Democracies Toward Parliamen-
tary Control over War-and-Peace Decisions?, 90 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL ANNUAL MEETING 
36 (1996). 
55. Lori Damrosch, The Interface of National Constitutional Systems with International Law and 
Institutions on Using Military Forces: Changing Trends in Executive and Legislative Powers, in DEMO-
CRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 58 (Char-
lotte Ku & H. Jacobsen eds., 2003) (noting that “[o]nly when military policies are fully de-
bated and understood through the constitutional processes of democratic societies will there 
be sufficient assurance of public support for them”). 
56. Anne Peters, The (Non-)Judicialisation of War: German Constitutional Court Judgment on 
Rescue Operation Pegasus in Libya of 23 September 2015 (Part 1), EJIL TALK! (Oct. 21, 2015), 
https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/Peters_EJILTalk-The_Non-Judicialisation_of_War_ 
Pegasus1.pdf. 
57. Tom Ginsburg, Chaining the Dog of War: Comparative Data, 15 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 138, 139 (2014) (discussing the democratic peace literature). 
58. This is particularly true for multi-party systems, where legislatures are more likely 
to serve as a veto point. Legislatures in single-party systems or parliamentary systems in 
which the executive comes from a strong majority party may play a weaker role in checking 
the executive’s resort to force. 
59. Ginsburg, supra note 57, at 146. 
 
 
 
Cyber Autonomy and Democratic Accountability Vol. 96 
479 
 
 
 
 
 
In other words, the legislative role in making decisions to use force may play 
an important role in determining whether and when States go to war and 
whether they win those wars. 
 
B. Specific Legislative Roles in War-Making 
 
Even if many State constitutions and laws assign legislatures some role in 
making decisions about initiating and conducting war, not all systems work 
identically. Some constitutions envision a role for legislatures to approve the 
use of force or troop deployments ex ante, while others authorize legislatures 
to approve or condemn executive decisions ex post. Legislatures also may 
oversee the executive’s military strategy, hold votes of “no confidence” and 
approve conflict-related expenditures. This section briefly details these dis-
tinct roles to set the stage for understanding how cyber autonomy might 
affect these roles in the future.60 
 
1. Authorizing Force Ex Ante 
 
Some constitutional systems envision a role for legislatures in authorizing 
force ex ante. The Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Nor-
way, Netherlands, Sweden and Mexico all ostensibly require prior parliamen-
tary approval before the executive may send troops abroad.61 In Sweden, for 
instance, the government can only send armed forces abroad in accordance 
with a specific law that sets forth the grounds for such action.62 The German 
Constitutional Court has held that German armed forces can only be de-
ployed abroad for non-defensive purposes with prior legislative approval.63 
                                                                                                                      
60. Hans Born & Heiner Hänggi, The Use of Force under International Auspices: Strengthening 
Parliamentary Accountability, GENEVA CENTRE OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED 
FORCES (2005), https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/pp07_ 
use-of-force.pdf. 
61. Id. at 8 (including citations to relevant provisions). For Mexico, see CONSTITUCIÓN 
POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [CONSTITUTION], art. 89, § VIII (giving 
the President the power to declare war, “having the previous authorization of the Con-
gress,”), art. 73, § XII (giving Congress the power to declare war). Of course, the start of a 
cyber conflict would not entail sending troops abroad, but could quickly transition to that. 
62. Born & Hänggi, supra note 60, at 7; GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN, SVERIGES RIKS-
DAG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SWEDEN: THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS AND THE RIKSDAG 
ACT, at 50 (2016), https://www.riksdagen.se/globalassets/07.-dokument--lagar/the-con-
stitution-of-sweden-160628.pdf. 
63. Russ Miller, Germany’s Basic Law and the Use of Force, 17 INDIANA JOURNAL OF 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 197, 202 (2010). 
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In contrast, the legislatures of Belgium, Canada, France, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States lack the right of prior authorization in most 
cases.64 
In the United States, for instance, the executive currently interprets the 
Constitution to allow it to use force abroad without advance congressional 
authorization except in a limited set of cases in which the number of troops 
and the circumstances in which they would be deployed rise to the level of 
“war in a constitutional sense.”65 In the United Kingdom, the British gov-
ernment possesses prerogative powers to deploy the UK armed forces, and 
therefore historically did not seek legislative permission in advance to do so. 
In 2011, however, the government acknowledged that a new expectation had 
emerged that the House of Commons would have the chance to debate the 
deployment of military forces in advance, except in an emergency.66 That 
new convention was put to the test when the UK government sought legis-
lative approval in 2013 for military action in Syria and Parliament voted it 
down. However, the UK undertook limited airstrikes against Syrian chemical 
weapons capabilities in 2018 without consulting Parliament first, suggesting 
that the government will only follow the convention where possible military 
action is premeditated and will entail the deployment of military forces in an 
offensive capacity.67 
One obvious benefit to legislative participation in decisions to resort to 
force in the first instance is that legislatures can constrain “overzealous ex-
ecutives by requiring evidence to justify wars.”68 As Ginsburg notes, the 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution believed that congressional involvement in 
decisions related to force would slow down war-making except in true emer-
gencies. For democracies today, such deliberation may help “‘screen’ wars: 
ensuring that the conflicts that the nation enters into are ‘good’ wars, while 
eschewing ‘bad’ wars.”69 
                                                                                                                      
64. Born & Hänggi, supra note 60, at 6, 7. 
65. See, e.g., Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Steven A. Engel to Counsel 
to the President, April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities (May 31, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1067551/download. 
66. UNITED KINGDOM, HOUSE OF COMMONS, PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL FOR MIL-
ITARY ACTION (Apr. 17, 2018), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/ 
cbp-7166/. 
67. Id. Most uses of highly autonomous cyber operations would not meet that test. 
68. Ginsburg, supra note 57, at 146. 
69. Id. at 142, 145; Yasuo Hasebe, War Powers, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARA-
TIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 465 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds., 2012) (noting that 
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A constitutional requirement of ex ante authorization is a powerful tool 
for legislatures compared to ex post powers because the introduction of 
troops often operates as a one-way ratchet. Once a State has committed 
troops to a conflict, legislatures have a hard time voting to withdraw those 
troops because doing so may be seen by the public as unpatriotic or a sign 
of weakness.70 Therefore, legislatures that have a role in authorizing force ex 
ante have far more leverage in the decision-making process than do those 
whose only authorizing role arises after the fact. 
Nevertheless, most systems that give their legislature ex ante powers in-
clude an exception that allows the executive to respond to imminent attacks 
or emergencies without advance legislative approval.71 Even the laws of a 
State such as Germany, in which both the legislature and the judiciary play 
significant roles in decisions about the resort to force, contemplate that there 
will be situations of “imminent danger” in which the executive must act on 
its own without pre-approval by the legislature.72 In such cases, however, the 
executive must promptly seek approval from the German parliament after-
wards.73 
One way that legislatures can implement their ex ante authority is to enact 
laws that stipulate the settings in which and adversaries against whom the 
executive is authorized to use force. In the United States, these often take 
                                                                                                                      
legislative approval for armed force provides more legitimacy and popular support for the 
operations). 
70. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (discussing why members 
of Congress who opposed the continuation of the Vietnam War might nevertheless vote to 
appropriate money, to avoid abandoning the forces already fighting). 
71. See, e.g., REGERINGSFORMEN [CONSTITUTION] 15:13 (Sweden) (giving the govern-
ment the right to deploy Swedish armed forces to meet an armed attack on Sweden or 
prevent a violation of Sweden’s territory); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) 
(implying a presidential “repel attacks” power); GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER 
NEDERLANDEN [CONSTITUTION], art. 96, sub. 2 (Netherlands) (“approval [for a declaration 
of a state of war] shall not be required in cases where consultation with Parliament proves 
to be impossible as a consequence of the actual existence of a state of war”), GLASILO 
URADNI LIST REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [CONSTITUTION], art. 92 (Slovenia); EESTI VABARIIGI 
PÕHISEADUS [CONSTITUTION], arts. 65, sub. 15, 128 (Estonia); TÜRKÍYE CUMHURÍYETÍ 
ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION], art. 92 (Turkey). 
72. Peters, supra note 56. 
73. Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz [Parliamentary Participation Act], § 5 (Germany); see also 
Hasebe, supra note 69, at 478 (noting that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces Act provides 
that the Diet (national legislature) must authorize force in advance, except when there is no 
time to obtain such authorization, and that the Prime Minister “may order the engagement 
of the [Self-Defence Forces] when an attack is clearly imminent and the necessity of the 
engagement is recognized”). 
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the form of Authorizations to Use Military Force (AUMFs). In a little-no-
ticed statute in 2018, Congress accorded the President authority akin to an 
AUMF for certain cyber operations. Section 1642 of the John McCain Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2019 states, 
 
In the event that the National Command Authority [i.e., the President and 
the Secretary of Defense] determines that the Russian Federation, People’s 
Republic of China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or Islamic Re-
public of Iran is conducting an active, systematic, and ongoing campaign 
of attacks against the Government or people of the United States in cyber-
space, . . . the National Command Authority may authorize the Secretary 
of Defense, acting through the Commander of the United States Cyber 
Command, to take appropriate and proportional action in foreign cyber-
space to disrupt, defeat, and deter such attacks . . . .74 
 
When the Defense Department employs this authority, the Secretary of 
Defense must report to the congressional defense committees no later than 
forty-eight hours after the operation; must include the actions in a quarterly 
report to the defense committees; and must report annually to the congres-
sional defense, intelligence and foreign affairs committees about the “scope 
and intensity” of the cyber attacks on the United States.75 Although the pro-
vision does not resemble most of Congress’ ex ante force authorizations, “it 
is an AUMF of a very narrow and specific variety.”76 Part IV considers the 
effect of cyber autonomy on authorizations like this one. 
                                                                                                                      
74. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. 
No. 115-232, § 1642(a)(2), 1642(c), 132 Stat. 1636 (2018) [hereinafter 2019 NDAA]. 
75. Id. 
76. Robert Chesney, The Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA, LAWFARE 
(July 26, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operations-and-new-nd 
aa (noting that the U.S. Congress has enacted at least two other provisions that bolster the 
Defense Department’s ability to undertake cyber operations when appropriately authorized 
to do so); see 2019 NDAA, supra note 74, § 1632; 10 U.S.C. § 394 (2019) 
The Secretary of Defense shall develop, prepare, and coordinate; make ready all armed 
forces for purposes of; and, when appropriately authorized to do so, conduct, military cyber 
activities or operations in cyberspace, . . . to defend the United States and its allies, including 
in response to malicious cyber activity carried out against the United States or a United 
States person by a foreign power. 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112–81, § 954 (2011), 125 
Stat. 1551 
Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon direction by 
the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies 
and interests, subject to (1) the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department 
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2. Ratifying Force Ex Post 
 
Another role for legislatures is to ratify or shape the executive’s use of force 
ex post. Ginsburg, who reviewed 745 constitutions that entered into force 
since 1789, noted that since the early 1800s, constitutions have tended to 
assign the executive the power to resort to force. However, “legislatures re-
tain a major role in war policy” because they retain the power after the fact 
to approve or strike down the executive’s decision to resort to force or to 
deploy troops.77 France’s current constitution, for instance, anticipates that 
its National Assembly must authorize declarations of war but “includes no 
requirement that parliamentary authorization be prior to the declaration of 
war.”78 For uses of force short of war, which include many forcible acts, the 
French executive must notify the Assembly of its decision to forcibly inter-
vene abroad no later than three days after the intervention. The Assembly 
can debate the question, but does not actually vote on it, though if the inter-
vention exceeds four months, the executive must ask the Assembly to au-
thorize that extension.79 Some States envision greater legislative control ex 
post. The laws of Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, for example, 
contemplate not only that those legislatures will have powers of prior au-
thorization but also that they will have the opportunity to subsequently ap-
prove the mission’s mandate, operational guidelines and duration.80 
Under a model of ex post legislative approval, it is possible that the exec-
utive will reject or ignore subsequent legislative condemnation of its troop 
deployments or other military operations. As noted above, though, the more 
likely scenario is that legislatures will find it hard not to support executive 
decisions, at least where the executive is responding to an actual attack on 
the country or where it has committed troops already. There is more political 
room for a legislature to condemn after the fact the executive’s decision to 
use force or deploy troops where the forcible episode is completed quickly 
or there are few troops on the ground overseas. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and (2) the War Powers 
Resolution. 
77. Ginsburg, supra note 57, at 149–50. 
78. Hasebe, supra note 69, at 473 (discussing Article 35 of the French Constitution). 
79. Id. at 474–75. 
80. Born & Hänggi, supra note 60, at 8. 
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3. Funding and Oversight 
 
In addition to helping to regulate the initiation, conduct and cessation of 
military operations, legislatures play at least two other significant force-re-
lated roles. First, legislatures fund the military operations. This power of the 
purse can provide significant leverage over how and where the executive 
conducts those operations and the length of time for which the executive 
can fight. Like ex post ratifications, however, legislators may feel pressure to 
continue to fund conflicts they do not support because withholding funds 
from the troops risks seeming unpatriotic.81 
Second, legislatures can conduct oversight for the duration of the con-
flict, to examine how the executive is conducting the conflict, whether it is 
exceeding its mandate, whether it is using resources wisely and whether the 
armed forces are complying with international and domestic laws.82 Depend-
ing on the capacity of the legislative committees tasked with oversight re-
sponsibilities, these legislators can play an important role in holding the ex-
ecutive accountable for illegal, incompetent or unwise military and policy 
decisions.83 
Even though most States authorize their executives to act without legis-
lative approval in the face of imminent attacks, legislatures have a range of 
roles to play in authorizing their executives to use force, demanding justifi-
cations from the executives about the decision to enter into a conflict and 
generally enhancing democratic accountability for warfighting. A legislature’s 
ability to enhance its executive’s compliance with public law values – includ-
ing international law – depends on a reliable flow of information between 
the executive and the legislature; on the legislature’s competence to under-
stand the strategy, tactics and tools that the executive is using; and on ade-
quate time to make informed decisions. The introduction of significant levels 
of cyber autonomy into the mix is likely to complicate these already-chal-
lenging tasks. 
 
                                                                                                                      
81. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
82. One salient example here is the U.S. Congress’s decision to try to terminate Presi-
dent Reagan’s funding of the Contras in Nicaragua. See Boland Amendment, Pub. L. No. 
98-473, § 8066(a), 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). 
83. Ashley Deeks, Secrecy Surrogates, 106 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 101 (forthcoming 2020) 
(discussing these qualities as public law values). 
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IV. THE EFFECT OF CYBER AUTONOMY ON DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Burgeoning cyber autonomy may affect democratic accountability for the 
use of force—as well as domestic checks and balances—in at least three 
ways. First, it may alter the balance of power between legislatures and exec-
utives, further empowering executives at the expense of legislative input 
about the timing, scope and legality of particular uses of force or offensive 
cyber operations. Second, it may alter the balance among a state’s executive 
agencies. Third, it may alter power dynamics among different types of offi-
cials within those agencies. If obtaining the input of a diversity of executive 
officials and securing a legislative role in decisions about the use of force 
helps improve the quality of decision-making, the overall effect of robust 
uses of cyber autonomy may be to increase the potential for “bad” conflicts 
between States.84 
 
A. Altering the Balance between Legislatures and Executives 
 
There are several ways in which autonomous cyber capabilities might further 
empower executives at the expense of the legislative role in force decisions, 
an imbalance that seems to dominate most governmental regimes today.85 
First, legislatures may suffer from information deficits about the existence 
and capabilities of the cyber systems. Second, there may be fewer opportu-
nities temporally for legislators to weigh in about the wisdom of forcible 
responses. Third, executive reliance on highly autonomous systems may 
make it very hard for legislators to provide meaningful oversight ex post. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
84. See Ginsburg, supra note 57, at 145. 
85. I do not mean to suggest that the growing autonomy of cyber operations is the only 
aspect of these operations that poses a threat to legislative capacity and oversight. For in-
stance, the increased precision of cyber tools means that they can produce a more potent 
effect on the intended victim, which could increase the risks of escalation. Further, the 
growth of the Internet of Things and the interconnectedness of many publicly- and pri-
vately-owned systems means that there are more ways for a State’s cyber operations to go 
wrong and have cascading, unintended effects. As with the growing autonomy of cyber 
systems, both of these developments make it critical for Congress to retain a role in over-
sight. 
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1. Information Deficits 
 
Assume that a State’s military develops autonomous cyber systems that can 
operate offensively or counter-offensively. An initial concern might be that 
legislators are unaware that the autonomous systems exist. Although legisla-
tures sometimes appropriate money for specific programs, appropriations 
laws may not necessarily articulate in detail the types and nature of weapons 
that militaries are and are not authorized to develop. Legislators may also 
have difficulty obtaining information about executive cyber doctrines that 
will guide how the executives will utilize their cyber tools—including auton-
omous tools. In the United States, even though Congress has well-staffed 
committees that oversee the defense and intelligence agencies, and recently 
has legislated with particularity in the cyber area, Congress had difficulty 
gaining access to a classified U.S. executive policy that sets out the approval 
process for conducting offensive cyber operations.86 It stands to reason that 
Congress—let alone the legislatures of other States—might also have prob-
lems obtaining information about the extent of the human role in those 
cyber operations. 
As a related matter, even if militaries share information with legislators 
about their cyber capabilities or doctrines, legislators may have difficulty un-
derstanding particular cyber capabilities, including autonomous capabilities 
and the risks attendant thereto. There are many reasons to think that the 
average legislator is not particularly savvy about technology.87 In one salient 
                                                                                                                      
86. Mark Pomerleau, After Tug-of-War, White House Shows Cyber Memo to Congress, FIFTH 
DOMAIN (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.fifthdomain.com/congress/2020/03/13/after-tug-
of-war-white-house-shows-cyber-memo-to-congress/ (describing a multi-month struggle 
to obtain access to National Security Presidential Memorandum 13). 
87. See Ashley Deeks, Facebook Unbound?, 105 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE 1, 6–7 
(2019) (noting that members of Congress lack sophisticated understandings of how new 
technologies work); Matthew Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 353, 380 (2016) 
(noting that “only the small subset of the legislature that sits of the relevant committee will 
hear the experts’ testimony, and even those legislators cannot afford to spend an inordinate 
amount of time conducting hearings on any on particular issue”); Karen Hao, Congress Wants 
to Protect You from Biased Algorithms, Deep Fakes, and Other Bad AI, MIT TECHNOLOGY RE-
VIEW (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/04/15/1136/congress-
wants-to-protect-you-from-biased-algorithms-deepfakes-and-other-bad-ai/ (noting that 
“only a handful of members of Congress have a deep enough technical grasp of data and 
machine learning to approach regulation in an appropriately nuanced manner”); Julia Black 
& Andrew Murray, Regulating AI and Machine Learning: Setting the Regulatory Agenda, 10 EURO-
PEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 3, § 5 (2019), https://ejlt.org/index.php/ 
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example, several U.S. senators proposed legislation in 2016 that would have 
required companies to provide the government with access to encrypted data 
when a court had so ordered. Critics savaged the bill, not only because they 
objected to the policy but also because the bill seemed to reflect a flawed 
understanding of encryption technology.88 
To counter this deficit, the U.S. Government Accountability Office—an 
agency within the legislative branch—has proposed setting up a new office 
to help Congress understand the impacts of technology-related policies that 
it pursues,89 and others have suggested reviving the now-defunct Office of 
Technology Assessment, which provided Congress with scientific expertise 
to match that of the Executive Branch.90 In the UK, a joint parliamentary 
committee has recommended that the Government Office for Artificial In-
telligence and the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation—which will con-
sist of technical and ethics experts—should identify for Parliament any gaps 
in existing regulations, suggesting that Parliament itself must rely on outside 
                                                                                                                      
ejlt/article/view/722 (“[T]here is little evidence that regulators have the necessary capacity 
properly to evaluate all the actual and potential uses of AI in their regulatory domains. 
Asymmetries of knowledge and skills are amplified in the highly technical area of AI.”). 
88. Julian Sanchez, Feinstein-Burr: The Bill that Bans Your Browser, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 
29, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/30740/feinstein-burr-bill-bans-browser/. 
89. Jack Corrigan, Inside GAO’s Plan to Make Congress More Tech-Savvy, NEXTGOV (Mar. 
20, 2019), https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2019/03/inside-gaos-plan-make-con-
gress-more-tech-savvy/155689; Cat Zakrzewski, These Scientists Are Trying to Help Congress Get 
Smarter About Tech, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 27, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology-202/2020/01/27/the-technology-202-these-
scientists-are-trying-to-help-congress-get-smarter-about-tech/5e2b1fcc602ff14e660592 
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90. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Government Accountability Office (Oct. 
13, 1977), https://www.gao.gov/products/103962; see also U.S. House of Representatives, 
Congressional Artificial Intelligence Caucus, https://artificialintelligencecaucus-olson. 
house.gov (last visited Oct. 22, 2020) (describing the “AI Caucus” in Congress, created to 
“inform policymakers of the technological, economic and social impacts of advances in AI” 
by bringing together academics, private sector officials, and government officials); Mike 
Miesen et al., Building a 21st Century Congress: Improving Congress’s Science and Technology Expertise, 
BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Sept. 2019), https://www. 
belfercenter.org/publication/building-21st-century-congress-improving-congresss-sci-
ence-and-technology-expertise (discussing Congress’s demand for science and technology 
expertise and the root causes of its lack of technological capacity); Caroline Kenny et al., 
Legislative Science Advice in Europe: The Case for International Comparative Research, PALGRAVE 
COMMUNICATIONS 3 (2017), https://www.nature.com/articles/palcomms201730 (discuss-
ing the role for scientific advice in legislatures in the UK and Europe). 
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experts for artificial intelligence-related analysis.91 Legislatures with small de-
fense committees may face particular challenges in overseeing cyber opera-
tions generally—to say nothing of highly autonomous cyber operations—
because their legislators presumably are spread more thinly across issue ar-
eas. Further, if they have small budgets, they will be able to employ fewer 
staffers and can convene fewer hearings in which outside experts could help 
them understand the issues and technologies they confront.92 
Even legislators with a basic understanding of cyber operations may not 
have a full appreciation for the risks of autonomous operations and may not 
be positioned to ask the right questions of the executive branch. Indeed, not 
all of the executive branch officials involved in decision-making may under-
stand the capabilities and risks of complex, highly autonomous cyber sys-
tems. In the context of electronic surveillance systems, for example, in 2013 
the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) declassified a set of docu-
ments that revealed a lack of compliance with judicial mandates. The DNI 
explained that the compliance problems 
 
stemmed in large part from the complexity of the technology employed in 
connection with the bulk telephony metadata collection program, interac-
tion of that technology with other NSA systems, and a lack of a shared 
understanding among various NSA components about how certain aspects 
of the complex architecture supporting the program functioned. These 
gaps in understanding led, in turn, to unintentional misrepresentations in 
the way the collection was described to the FISC.93 
 
If some intelligence officials within a single agency were unclear about how 
the technology supporting an electronic surveillance program worked, it is 
easy to imagine how legislators would have had trouble understanding that 
                                                                                                                      
91. UNITED KINGDOM, HOUSE OF LORDS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ARTIFICIAL IN-
TELLIGENCE, AI IN THE UK: READY, WILLING AND ABLE?, ¶ 386 (2018), https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/jrc/communities/sites/jrccties/files/ai_in_the_uk.pdf; see also UNITED KINGDOM, 
OFFICE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisa-
tions/office-for-artificial-intelligence. 
92. For example, Hungary’s Defense Committee had a budget of €4,000 ($4,800) in 
2004. Born & Hänggi, supra note 60, at 10. 
93. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Press Release, DNI Clapper Declas-
sifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-
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program and—likewise—how they might struggle to understand very tech-
nical cyber tools that include significant levels of autonomy. 
To some extent, this lack of understanding reflects a broader societal 
challenge posed by systems that rely on machine-learning tools. Those sys-
tems are often described as “black boxes” because the weight they give to 
factors within the data to reach predictions or recommendations is generally 
opaque. As a result, not only legislators but humans generally find it difficult 
to interpret or explain the outputs of systems that operate with high levels 
of autonomy. Computer scientists and militaries are keenly aware of this 
problem and are working to produce “explainable” or “interpretable” artifi-
cial intelligence, sometimes referred to as “white box” models. As discussed 
below, legislatures have an opportunity to shape the level of explainability of 
the executives’ cyber algorithms. Requiring executives to produce algorithms 
that are more transparent might also make it easier for legislators to hold 
executive actors accountable because transparent algorithms might be easier 
to audit after the fact than human decisionmakers. 
 
2. Limited Opportunity for Legal and Policy Input 
 
In some States, legislatures can constrain “overzealous executives by requir-
ing evidence to justify wars.”94 This is primarily true when the State’s system 
contemplates legislative approval for the use of force ex ante. It also assumes 
that there is time for legislative input before the executive makes a decision 
to resort to force. But the U.S. executive branch, for one, has taken the view 
that very few uses of force require congressional pre-authorization. If the 
only time ex ante congressional authorization for military operations is legally 
necessary is when the United States plans to deploy hundreds of thousands 
of troops abroad, cyber operations—whether human-in-the-loop or out-of-
the-loop—will almost never reach the threshold of “war in a constitutional 
sense.”95 Hostile cyber exchanges, at least when the salvos remain within the 
cyber realm, are unlikely to pose an immediate and significant threat to U.S. 
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troops and will not trigger the need for congressional authorization under 
the “Declare War” clause. Yet autonomous cyber systems may pose a rea-
sonable chance of escalation—whether intended or unintended—such that 
legislative input might be normatively desirable ex ante. Even for States 
whose legal systems contain a clear ex ante requirement for legislative author-
ization, that authorization may be limited to troop deployments, which will 
not cover cyber exchanges, or may contain an emergency carveout, which 
would cover responses to sudden cyber attacks.96 
As noted above, the U.S. Congress has already provided limited ex ante 
authorization for the executive to “take appropriate and proportional action 
in foreign cyberspace to disrupt, defeat, and deter such attacks” when those 
systematic attack campaigns come from Iran, North Korea, Russia or 
China.97 This provision may actually serve as a limitation on the use of au-
tonomous cyber systems, as it requires the executive to identify the source 
of the hostile cyber campaign. Unless the executive’s autonomous cyber sys-
tem is crafted to respond only to hostile operations that bear attack signa-
tures from the named States, the executive would have difficulty relying on 
this authorization to support the use of such a system.98 As discussed in Part 
V, legislatures should consider providing this kind of advance authorization, 
which can both serve as permission for and constraint on the use of cyber 
autonomy. 
 
3. Time Constraints 
 
As a related matter, highly autonomous cyber systems narrow significantly 
whatever consultative role legislatures may retain for themselves, at least in 
                                                                                                                      
96. That said, in the United States, the President often complies with statutory re-
strictions on his use of the military, even as he asserts constitutional objections to those 
statutes. See David Barron & Martin Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – A 
Constitutional History, 121 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 941 (2008). Thus, it would be worthwhile 
for Congress—and possibly other legislatures—to carefully consider how to set boundaries 
on the use of autonomous cyber tools. 
97. See 2019 NDAA, supra note 74, § 1642. 
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II powers, including the commander-in-chief power, under the Constitution, even if it 
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the window before a specific forcible cyber exchange takes place. The most 
significant reason to deploy autonomous cyber tools is to allow the system 
to operate at lightning speeds. Yet it is already the case today—before the 
widespread use of highly autonomous cyber tools—that executives, acting 
in response to perceived imminent threats of armed attacks on their States, 
employ force without legislative approval or even consultation. These threats 
may mostly come from terrorists today, but it is increasingly possible to con-
ceive of cyber attacks as creating situations in which executive officials will 
need to respond in a very short time frame. 
Purely defensive autonomous cyber operations—those that use auton-
omy only to identify and fend off hostile cyber operations within one’s own 
system—are unlikely to implicate congressional prerogatives, as these set-
tings will fall within the executives’ “repel attacks” powers found in many 
States’ constitutions. But “offensive” cyber capabilities that leave one’s own 
system,99 even in an act of self-defense, are more likely to implicate those 
prerogatives because they increase the chance of escalation and error. Fur-
ther, autonomous systems “may operate at speeds that make it impossible 
for the operator to meaningfully intervene.”100 Thus, once a State deploys an 
autonomous cyber tool that has the capacity to reach outside that State’s own 
system and inflict substantial harm, there will be no opportunity for congres-
sional consultation on particular operations. 
 
4. Challenges to Ex Post Oversight 
 
One of the more reliable roles for legislatures during a conflict is the provi-
sion of oversight. A legislative body can help unearth how conflicts started, 
whether the State is achieving its military and strategic goals and whether it 
is complying with domestic and international laws during the fight. Legisla-
tures often rely on executive actors to provide information about the con-
flict, but legislators can also convene hearings of outside experts and collect 
open-source intelligence about the situation from journalists on the ground. 
Cyber hostilities, particularly those conducted by highly autonomous sys-
tems, will be far harder to understand and oversee. Conducting forensic au-
dits that recreate what happened during a cyber exchange and translate them 
into language that congressional overseers can understand will be more chal-
lenging than reviewing radar patterns or identifying the source of limpet 
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mines found on oil tankers.101 The use of artificial intelligence to facilitate 
autonomy will pose “black box” problems for legislators who seek to audit 
how the cyber operations played out. Further, there will be no “war zone” 
to which journalists or outside analysts can travel to talk to troops on the 
ground about what they are seeing. As a result, there will be far fewer open-
source reports about what has transpired during these “invisible” cyber op-
erations, unless and until they morph into kinetic conflicts. 
In the United States, Congress has begun to address this potential lack 
of visibility by mandating that the executive report to it after conducting 
certain types of cyber operations. As Matthew Waxman notes, 
 
Congress has mandated special reporting requirements for offensive and 
“sensitive” cyber-operations to the armed services committees.102 Cyber-
attacks conducted as covert action by the CIA would be reported separately 
to the intelligence committees, as would other intelligence activities that 
might fit within the definition here of cyber-attacks. Such reporting is foun-
dational to other congressional roles, because it keeps Congress—or at 
least certain committees—informed of executive branch actions that would 
otherwise be largely invisible.103 
 
Existing statutes require the U.S. military to report to the congressional 
defense committees within forty-eight hours when it conducts a cyber oper-
ation determined to have a medium or high probability of political retalia-
tion, detection or collateral effects and is intended to cause effects in an area 
in which the United States is not already involved in hostilities.104 This kind 
of requirement is helpful—at least on its face—because it puts some mem-
bers of Congress on notice of situations that might lead to conflict. But a 
situation between two States could escalate significantly within forty-eight 
hours, particularly if the States involved are using autonomous systems that 
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are not adequately engineered to avoid escalation and to minimize risks of 
misdirecting responses. Further, it is not yet clear how these reporting rules 
are functioning and whether Congress is receiving the information that it 
believes it needs to provide adequate oversight.105 
 
B. Altering the Balance Among Executive Agencies 
 
The growth of autonomous cyber systems is likely to further alter the current 
balance between executives and legislatures in use of force decisions. But the 
use of autonomous cyber tools also has the potential to affect the balance of 
power within executive branches themselves. One interesting question here 
is whether the use of high levels of cyber autonomy will continue to push 
power out to the militaries as the creators and operators of these autono-
mous tools, or whether it offers an unexpected opportunity to readjust and 
centralize the locus of some of the decision-making associated with these 
tools. 
On its face, it might appear that highly autonomous cyber tools will em-
power militaries at the expense of other executive agencies that have im-
portant equities in foreign policy decision-making, such as foreign and justice 
ministries. Even if these other agencies are involved in discussions about 
cyber strategy, they likely lack the technological sophistication that military 
coders and cyber operators possess and so may have difficulty understanding 
whether highly autonomous cyber tools advance or hinder certain policy ob-
jectives and what level of risk these systems pose. Further, as with any mili-
tary operation, those who sit closest to the point of execution have the great-
est power to make last-minute decisions and adjustments. Although auton-
omous systems will take some of that control from those cyber operators, 
those operators nevertheless have more direct “eyes on” the operations and 
their effects. In the United States, Congress’ recent legislative acts seem to 
have enabled this. As Waxman notes, “Congress has clarified the Defense 
Department’s authority to conduct offensive cyber-operations, thereby 
strengthening its position within the executive branch and facilitating action 
by alleviating legal doubts about its mandate.”106 
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However, there is a possibility that increased autonomy could reverse 
this flow of power to militaries. Increased autonomy in warfighting tasks 
may—perhaps ironically—offer the opportunity to centralize decision-mak-
ing, as the process of building machine-learning algorithms for warfighting 
systems, including cyber systems, seeks to incorporate the commander’s in-
tent and remain sensitive to legal constraints. These centripetal forces may 
even mean that other national security agencies begin to play a role in devel-
oping the policies undergirding those algorithms.107 In the United States, the 
National Security Council and the State Department, for instance, may seek 
to inform the algorithms’ contents and structure to ensure that they comply 
with the laws of armed conflict and the UN Charter. 
Today, the U.S. military has a well-established weapons review process; 
non-military lawyers are not involved. Likewise, judge advocates provide le-
gal advice to commanders during armed conflict without consulting the De-
fense Department’s Office of the General Counsel, let alone the National 
Security Council or other executive agencies. And yet there may be pressure 
to adjust the traditional process when the government builds machine-learn-
ing systems that can undertake autonomous action during conflict. If the use 
of the system will have significant foreign relations implications and if the 
system’s recommendations implicate legal questions that already have been 
the subject of significant interagency interest, other agencies’ policymakers 
and lawyers may demand a role. The lawyers might want to craft guidance in 
advance about what types of autonomous cyber tools would or would not 
meet underlying international law standards, for instance. And because the 
coding process will involve decisions about the nuances of that law and will 
happen before the system is deployed, there may be greater opportunities 
for a broader set of U.S. government actors to claim a stake in those deci-
sions than there is in kinetic lethal operations downrange. 
There would be both benefits and costs to such a development. Militar-
ies likely would perceive this potential centralization of decision-making as 
unattractive and might resist sharing the authority to make algorithmic 
choices about autonomous cyber tools. Interagency lawyers might also strug-
gle to reach consensus about what features to incorporate into those tools. 
On the other hand, obtaining interagency understanding and acceptance of 
autonomous cyber tools would bolster the military’s confidence about their 
use and would also allow that State’s diplomats and foreign ministry lawyers 
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to engage more deeply with allies on what may be controversial uses of ma-
chine learning and cyber tools. 
Whether the growth in cyber autonomy ends up diminishing or increas-
ing the role of non-military executive agencies will depend on decisions made 
by legislatures, choices by executive branch leadership, and the efforts (or 
lack thereof) of civilian national security agencies to help define the param-
eters of autonomous cyber tools as they are developed. 
 
C. Altering the Balance Within Executive Agencies 
 
Finally, within individual executive agencies, autonomous cyber tools, like 
other high-technology tools, will almost inevitably empower operators and 
computer scientists over lawyers. As I have noted elsewhere, in contexts 
driven by high-technology problems, data scientists will become relatively 
more important to policymakers than they have been in the past, and senior 
officials may start to treat their input as just as important to an international 
law or foreign policy decision as that of their international lawyers. 108 In my 
view, “It will be the data scientists who can suggest new text-as-data tools 
and interpret the results of existing models. This means that the data scien-
tists who embrace and understand the problems that international lawyers 
and diplomats face will be most effective in this setting.”109 Among officials 
who are not cyber experts, military and civilian actors who are technologi-
cally literate will be empowered relative to those who disdain technology or 
are unable to grasp its basic capabilities, limitations, and risks.110 Thus, law-
yers and policymakers who seek to work with data scientists and program-
mers to understand autonomous cyber tools will gain power relative to their 
counterparts who cannot or will not do so.111 
 
V. PRESERVING ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
In light of the range of challenges to democratic accountability and oversight 
that high levels of cyber autonomy will pose, this Part considers steps that 
States might take to meet some of those challenges. A State’s legislature, its 
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executive branch and its allies all can take actions to ensure that the State’s 
use of autonomous cyber tools remains responsive to democratic systems of 
governance. 
 
A. Preserving Legislative Participation 
 
Legislatures could take at least two steps to help preserve a role for them-
selves in a world of autonomous cyber tools. First, they could bolster their 
own technological expertise and access to high-tech experts. Second, they 
could embrace the possibilities for legislation that sets appropriate parame-
ters on the executive branch’s development and use of highly autonomous 
cyber systems. 
 
1. Developing Expertise 
 
A range of scholars have suggested ways in which legislatures could improve 
their understanding of technology and thus enhance their ability to legislate 
intelligently about such issues. One underlying issue is a lack of resources: if 
legislatures want to be able to hire and retain technologically savvy staff, and 
conduct hearings that bring in a range of expert views on issues such as au-
tonomous cyber tools, they need the funds to do so. In the United States, 
one think tank notes, “Congress has simply not given itself the resources 
needed to efficiently and effectively absorb new information—particularly 
on complex [science and technology] topics.”112 Others have advocated that 
the U.S. Congress establish an internal body that is nimble, bipartisan and 
focused on providing options rather than recommendations.113 Various Eu-
ropean States have already established bodies that provide science and tech-
nology advice to legislatures; the United States could draw ideas from some 
of the different models represented there.114 The European bodies should 
also ensure that they have experts at hand who understand machine learning 
and autonomous cyber systems, which will facilitate the legislators’ ability to 
regulate such systems as they come online. Outside experts can be very use-
ful here, both to educate legislatures and to surface and articulate competing 
views about the benefits and costs of this technology. 
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Legislatures should also consider setting up “machine learning boot 
camps” for staffers who work on national security-related committees, to 
expose them to the basics of machine learning and cyber tools. Sessions run 
by outside tech experts who can present the information in clear, non-parti-
san, policy-relevant ways would be a helpful tool to ensure basic competence 
among policy and legal staff. In the United States, for example, Stanford 
University runs a “Cyber and Artificial Intelligence Boot Camp” for congres-
sional staffers. The boot camp draws on the experience of cybersecurity pro-
fessionals, scholars, business leaders and lawyers to provide staffers with 
basic technical instruction, threat perspectives and exposure to simulated at-
tacks.115 Legislatures might also ask to observe actual testing and verification 
processes that take place inside the militaries, to understand how militaries 
decide that they have confidence in a particular autonomous system before 
deploying it. 
 
2. Updating Legislative Structures and Authorities 
 
In addition to raising their level of technological fluency, legislators should 
resist further erosion of their roles in overseeing the use of force and offen-
sive cyber operations by updating their own ability to oversee cyber opera-
tions. One way to do this is to establish oversight committees dedicated spe-
cifically to cyber issues, as the recent Cyber Solarium project in the United 
States recommended. The Solarium report proposes that the U.S. Congress 
create House and Senate committees on cybersecurity “to provide integrated 
oversight of the cybersecurity efforts dispersed across the federal govern-
ment.”116 The committees, which presumably would draw their membership 
from existing armed services, intelligence and homeland security commit-
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tees, could develop a deeper expertise on cyber issues—including the func-
tions of autonomy in cyber settings—while building on their members’ past 
experiences with war powers, use of force and technological questions. 
Legislatures could also direct new regulatory efforts at autonomous 
cyber systems. For States in which existing statutes (rather than the consti-
tution) allocate powers between the executive and legislatures, those legisla-
tures should evaluate whether the statutes adequately reach cyber operations 
that either constitute or could quickly lead to international uses of force. In 
the United States, for example, the War Powers Resolution (WPR) creates a 
structure for executive consultation with and reporting to Congress before 
deploying armed forces into hostilities, but it quite clearly would not apply 
to the bulk of cyber operations, whether autonomous or not. One scholar 
has suggested amending the WPR to trigger the executive’s notice require-
ment not only upon the introduction of troops but also upon the effectua-
tion of military capabilities (such as cyber tools) in a situation that violates 
the sovereignty of another State.117 This proposal might capture too many 
operations, however, especially if Congress’s real interest lies in retaining 
some input into cyber operations that have the potential for escalation. 
In any event, amending the WPR will be difficult, because the President 
would likely veto such changes. Thus, Congress would need to assemble a 
veto-proof majority that favors the bill.118 But there may be more modest 
fixes that could achieve similar goals: in the United States, one adjustment 
might be to expand the list of committees that receive the forty-eight hour 
reports from the Defense Department under section 1642 of the 2019 
NDAA.119 That is, when the military has undertaken a “sensitive military 
cyber operation” against Russia, China, North Korea or Iran, Congress 
should amend section 1642 to require that the military provide its written 
report not just to the armed services committees, but also the intelligence 
and foreign affairs committees. Congress should also expand this notice re-
quirement to cover sensitive military cyber operations against any State, not 
just these four States. Other legislatures should ensure that they are receiving 
adequate notice of significant cyber operations that implicate their regulatory 
and oversight powers. 
Legislatures might also turn their attention specifically to the growing 
use of autonomous cyber tools, erecting guard rails around their use. Even 
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if, as argued above, legislatures are not particularly well-suited to legislate in 
high-tech areas, legislatures should be able to navigate core legal and policy 
questions associated with autonomy.120 First, legislatures should evaluate 
whether they are willing to accept their militaries’ use of highly autonomous 
cyber tools generally. Some legislatures may accept the potential risks of such 
tools because they believe that the benefits are considerable. Others may not. 
Second, those legislatures that accept in theory the use of autonomous 
cyber tools should define the basic contexts in which those tools are permis-
sible, identify the adversaries against which the military may use the tools, 
define what kinds of foreseeable effects they are willing to tolerate, require 
the tools to be deployed in a way that is consistent with international legal 
requirements and require the executive to build in hard stops on escalation. 
Tim McFarland suggests, for instance, that a “cyber weapon might be trusted 
to locate and identify potential targets autonomously, but be required to seek 
human confirmation before attacking them.”121 The U.S. Defense Depart-
ment’s Defense Innovation Board suggested that the department consider 
setting “limitations on the types or amounts of force particular systems are 
authorized to use, the decoupling of various AI cyber systems from one an-
other, or layered authorizations for various operations.”122 Legislatures might 
fix in statute rules that require militaries to avoid uncontrolled escalation or 
impose the need for the effects of autonomous cyber operations to be re-
versible. They also could require their executive branches only employ soft-
ware in their cyber systems that is explainable or interpretable. 
At a more granular level, legislatures might take advantage of the fact 
that many cyber tools, even those that are increasingly autonomous, still re-
quire humans to carefully identify the tools’ targets in advance and tailor 
those tools specifically to that threat. Even if legislatures have significant 
difficulties weighing in on hostile cyber operations close to the time at which 
the executive initiates those operations (including by unleashing a largely au-
tonomous system), the legislatures could seek information from executive 
cyber operators about the pre-positioning efforts that the operators have un-
dertaken to launch operations in the future. Even if those pre-positioning 
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efforts may primarily be to gather intelligence rather than to conduct an of-
fensive operation, their dual-use nature means that legislatures would be 
within their rights to understand where and how their militaries or intelli-
gence services are poised to initiate future cyber operations. 
If a legislature is worried about its own abilities to substantively under-
stand autonomous cyber tools and the risks that they pose, it could estab-
lish a commission of independent experts—with appropriate security clear-
ances—to review, analyze and report on executive branch conduct involv-
ing relevant technologies. Such a commission might examine compliance 
with both international and domestic law, and could report regularly to leg-
islatures and, in an unclassified form, to the public. Precedent for these 
types of bodies include the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board in 
the United States and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in the 
United Kingdom.123 
Finally, legislatures should impose reporting requirements on executives 
so that legislators are aware of the types of autonomous cyber systems their 
militaries are using and what effects the systems are producing or have the 
capacity to produce. They might even require reports from foreign ministries 
on the foreign policy implications of any autonomous cyber operations that 
occur, thus ensuring that those ministries retain visibility into those opera-
tions.124 These steps will help preserve a level of democratic accountability 
for uses of force or other escalatory cyber actions. 
 
B. Securing Executive Balancing Among Agencies 
 
Legislators are not the only actors whose input may be threatened by increas-
ingly autonomous military tools. As Part IV discussed, the operation of 
highly autonomous cyber tools might diminish the opportunities for civilian 
officials within the executive branch to provide input into activities that 
could have major foreign policy consequences. Because the cyber tools that 
will perform these autonomous operations will be constructed in advance, 
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however, there is an opportunity for a range of relevant agencies to provide 
input into the parameters of those systems. One way to do this is to establish 
standing rules of engagement to guide how the military deploys the systems, 
and to craft those rules of engagement through an interagency process.125 
This would give civilian officials insight into and influence on the ways that 
the military uses advanced autonomous cyber systems. 
Even if interagency officials such as diplomats, career analysts and civil-
ian national security lawyers are not directly engaged in crafting military rules 
of engagement, there is still room for interagency participation in developing 
the rules of the road for autonomous cyber tools. Two scholars recently 
noted, “Insights from the literature on civil-military relations and planning 
suggest not leaving cyber strategy to soldiers alone.”126 They add, “There are 
major questions regarding how to craft a policy framework for cyber strategy 
that does not create dangerous escalation pathways or jeopardize civil liber-
ties and the free flow of information. These questions should not be reduced 
to expediting authorities at the expense of interagency coordination or civil-
ian oversight.”127 These scholars propose developing “flexible response op-
tions precleared to balance equities and assess risks,” which would ensure 
“time-sensitive responses without sacrificing interagency coordination.”128 
The need for militaries to respond in a timely way is a real one; disor-
ganized interagency processes can hinder that. Under the Obama Admin-
istration, the United States used an interagency cyber process that often got 
bogged down in infighting.129 Its “interagency de-confliction process suf-
fered from delays, bureaucratic inertia, ill-defined decision pathways, and the 
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lack of a clear ‘referee’ to resolve competing positions at the working 
level.”130 For example, there was a “fierce debate” among different executive 
agencies about whether to notify States hosting computer services used by 
ISIS that the United States planned to sabotage those services, a dispute that 
took weeks to resolve.131 The Trump Administration modified the inter-
agency process, apparently delegating far more decisions about offensive 
cyber operations to military commanders and decreasing interagency input. 
Further, the Trump Administration seems to have authorized the CIA to 
undertake covert offensive cyber operations against several adversaries, and 
to do so with a new level of independence from the White House.132 
Because the Trump policies and the subsequent operations under them 
remain classified, it is unclear whether these policies have produced better 
or worse results from a U.S. foreign policy perspective.133 In any event, de-
veloping an executive process that adequately balances the need for effective 
military cyber responses against harm to diplomatic, law enforcement and 
intelligence cooperation may take time and multiple iterations to get it right. 
In the United States, there is a debate, for example, about whether to create 
a “National Cyber Director” to coordinate those responses or whether to 
rely on the National Security Council to do so.134 Regardless of the specific 
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mechanisms they use, States must preserve important elements of civilian 
control and oversight over autonomous military cyber operations as they try 
to strike the proper balance among their various security and foreign policy 
equities. 
Just as legislative staff should improve their cyber literacy, so too should 
executive officials who work on cyber issues. Governments could detail na-
tional security lawyers in foreign, justice and intelligence ministries to tech-
nology offices in their own or other agencies. They could also detail cyber 
experts to policy positions, such as to positions in NATO or in their foreign 
ministries. This would have to be done in a way that rewards these officials 
for taking these non-traditional postings, along the lines of the requirement 
in the U.S. Goldwater-Nichols Act that requires joint-duty assignments for 
military officers seeking career advancement. Further, like legislative staffers, 
executive agencies should mandate that civilian officials who work on cyber 
and technology policy issues attend machine learning and cyber bootcamps 
to establish basic familiarity with those tools and their future prospects. 
These measures, which would provide a form of internal checks and bal-
ances among different executive agencies, should improve the quality of ex-
ecutive decision-making. As I noted elsewhere: 
 
Particularly in the national security area, where Congress and the courts 
face institutional and structural challenges to providing robust oversight, it 
has become commonplace to turn to checks within the executive branch 
itself as an alternative to inter-branch checking. The inter-agency policy-
making process requires—and indeed benefits from—exchanges among 
different executive agencies with distinct mission statements. Each agency 
pursues its own goals and policies, while trying to avoid policies that un-
dercut the agency’s mission or unduly weaken its standing in relation to 
other agencies.135 
 
It therefore seems healthy to ensure that a range of civilian agencies and 
officials retains a role in shaping the use of highly autonomous cyber tools. 
This is particularly true because it may be hard for legislatures to serve in 
their constitutional checking role in relation to these tools. Cyber autonomy 
may be critical at the moment of an attack, but there is ample room in ad-
vance to shape that autonomy’s characteristics and uses. 
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C. Roles for Allies and Other External Actors 
 
This article suggests that a range of States face some shared challenges when 
it comes to democratic accountability for the use of cyber autonomy. As a 
result, there may be value in sharing experiences among executive and legis-
lative branches of NATO member States. Understanding how allied coun-
terparts approach regulatory issues, deficiencies in technological knowledge 
and legal questions raised by highly autonomous military operations could 
produce creative ideas about ways to preserve and even bolster democratic 
accountability. Close allies might even consider sharing detailed information 
about their own autonomous systems, to identify and troubleshoot interna-
tional legal issues. 
Another constraint on executive actors undertaking classified national 
security operations, such as cyber operations, is U.S. technology and cyber-
security companies. In some settings, these companies have incentives to 
check poor executive decision-making that happens behind the veil of clas-
sification. These actors often have access to incoming cyber threats, have 
independent tools by which to attribute attacks and have the expertise to 
observe and critique certain U.S. government cyber operations.136 The U.S. 
Congress might do well to harness these “surrogates” as information-gath-
erers and a source of technological expertise about the growing autonomy 
of cyber operations by the United States and other States. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Highly autonomous cyber operations are near at hand. Even if States manage 
them very carefully, the potential exists for States to engage in unintended 
cyber hostile acts that might lead to armed conflict. At least in democracies, 
legislatures have historically had a role to play in checking executive branch 
military and foreign policy decisions, even if that role today is increasingly 
narrow. Both legislatures and executives have a responsibility and an oppor-
tunity to establish appropriate parameters for the use and oversight of au-
tonomous cyber weapons. These parameters should preserve input from a 
range of knowledgeable actors and thus ensure that democratic accountabil-
ity and other public law values, such as competence and legal compliance, 
are preserved in States’ autonomous cyber operations. 
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